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Uncertainty, its modelling and analysis have been discussed across many literatures including statistics and opera-
tional research, knowledge management and philosophy: (i) adherents to Bayesian approaches have usually argued
that uncertainty should either be modelled by probabilities or resolved by discussion that clariﬁes meaning; (ii) some
have followed Knight in distinguishing between contexts of risk and of uncertainty: the former admitting modelling
and analysis through probability; the latter not; (iii) there are also host of approaches in the literatures stemming from
Zadeh’s concept of a fuzzy set; (iv) theories of sense-making in the philosophy and management literatures see
knowledge and uncertainty as opposite extremes of human understanding and discuss the resolution of uncertainty
accordingly. Here I provide a personal perspective, taking a Bayesian stance. However, I adopt a softer position than
conventional and recognise the concerns in other approaches. In particular, I use the Cyneﬁn framework of decision
contexts to reﬂect on processes of modelling and analysis in statistical, risk and decision analysis. The approach builds
on several recent strands of discussion that argue for a convergence of qualitative scenario planning ideas and more
quantitative approaches to analysis. I discuss how these suggestions and discussions relate to some earlier thinking on
the methodology of modelling and, in particular, the concept of a ‘small world’ articulated by Savage.
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Introduction
To this day, I remember the excitement that I felt when I ﬁrst
encountered Bayesian Statistics and Decision Analysis. I found
the subjective perspective in which the uncertainty modelled
was my uncertainty entirely persuasive. The axiomatic bases of
probability and utility provided the rigour on which to build
quantitative analyses that balanced my uncertainties—or degrees
of belief—with my preferences to identify the best inference or
course of action. Over the years that view has softened and,
inﬂuenced by many colleagues, I have come to recognise:
● the variety of forms that uncertainty may take and that not all
may or need be modelled by probability, some may need be
addressed through sensitivity analysis or resolved through
introspection and discussion (French, 1995, 2003);
● the need to balance the harsh clarity of the theory with the
limits of human judgement in prescriptive modelling (French
and Smith, 1997; French et al, 2009);
● the value of sensitivity analysis in bounding and interpreting
the results of an analysis (French, 2003);
● the issues that arise when groups rather than individuals are
responsible for inferences and decisions (French et al, 2009;
Rios Insua and French, 2010; French, 2011);
● the value of the Cyneﬁn framework in categorising decision
contexts and identifying how to address many uncertainties
in an analysis (French, 2013).
But I have never really addressed the fundamental question
posed by Knight (1921): What do you do in an analysis when
an uncertainty is so deep that the range of plausible probabilities
that one might use to reﬂect the views of a group is effective
0–1, meaning that few issues are resolved by an analysis?
Knight distinguished circumstances of Risk, in which proba-
bilities are known, from those of Uncertainty, in which our
knowledge of some events or quantities is so meagre that some
probabilities are effectively completely unknown. This paper
takes a Bayesian perspective to explore analyses in which there
are some deep or Knightian uncertainties. Sense-making, issue
and problem formulation, and the process of modelling will also
be major foci. The paper continues the arguments begun in
French (2013) (for related discussions, see Cox, 2012;
Spiegelhalter and Riesch, 2011).
In the next section I begin the discussion of sense-making,
recognising that it takes place as much in our subconscious
thoughts and that formalising this process to build models
means that we must cross that vague boundary between
intuitive thought and formalised analysis. This leads into
reﬂections on the relationship between modelling and analysis,
on the one hand, and the real world, whatever that may be, on
the other. I then turn to Snowden’s Cyneﬁn framework to
articulate some further thoughts on the varied contexts of
*Correspondence: Simon French, Department of Statistics, University of
Warwick, Gibbet Hill Road, Coventry, Warwickshire CV4 7AL, UK.
E-mail: simon.french@warwick.ac.uk
Journal of the Operational Research Society (2015) 66, 1635–1645 © 2015 Operational Research Society Ltd. All rights reserved. 0160-5682/15
www.palgrave-journals.com/jors/
modelling. Cyneﬁn provides a structure in which to discuss
different forms of uncertainty from the deep uncertainty through
the growth of knowledge as we learn about the world to
stochastic behaviours and randomness. In turn, this will lead
us to a discussion of Savage’s conception of inference and
decision in the face of uncertainty and his introduction of a
‘small world’ to frame this; and thence to a consideration of
whether there is need to consider analyses based on several
small worlds rather than just one. We shall discover that while
there are ways to develop justiﬁcations of the Bayesian models
within ‘parallel small worlds’ and to develop scenario-focused
forms of decision analysis, it is not entirely straightforward to
do so. Moreover, the modiﬁcations required in Savage’s
approach elucidate the difﬁculties faced by decision makers in
interpreting the output of scenario-focused decision analysis.
Sense-making
Decision making, at least as I understand it, is always a
conscious act; unthinking, unconscious choice is not a decision.
Hence decisions are invariably preceded by some process of
formulation so that the choices are framed sufﬁciently for the
decision makers to be aware of some of the options and able to
assess each against their broad values, preferences and uncer-
tainties to be sure that no option stands out as the obvious
unconﬂicted choice (Janis and Mann, 1977). In other words,
decision makers need to be aware they face a decision. The
cognitive processes by which they frame the choice before them
fall into the broader area of sense-making (Weick, 1995; Kurtz
and Snowden, 2003).
In many, perhaps most, cases decision making will be
intuitive, based on what has become known as System 1
thinking (Chaiken et al, 1989; Kahneman, 2011). Such forms
of thinking tend to be somewhat superﬁcial, using simpler
forms of thinking on the fringes or outside of consciousness.
System 1 thinking is subject to behavioural biases; indeed, for
many years its literature on has been referred under the some-
what pejorative label heuristics and biases (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1974). In our professional lives, however, we eschew
System 1 thinking and adopt more conscious, analytic patterns
of thought, known as System 2 thinking. Oaksford and Chater
(2007) make a similar distinction but refer to Rationality1 and
Rationality2. In decisions relating to the management of busi-
ness, industry, communities and society, there is a need for
more rational, auditable processes that draw in wider sources of
information and evaluate options carefully, attending to details.
Thus explicit, analytic System 2 thinking should be the order of
the day. It may not be, but it should be. However, whether they
use System 1 or System 2 thinking, decision makers must be
aware of some options if a choice is to be made in any sentient
manner.
My concern is to discuss—primarily from a System 2
perspective—the sense-making processes that frame the choice
and lead into decision making, particularly how they relate to
the uncertainties, both aleatory arising from randomness and
epistemological arising from lack of knowledge. I shall broaden
the discussion to consider statistical inference and risk manage-
ment processes alongside decision processes, both because of
my personal interests and also because I ﬁnd that the three areas
overlap so much that it is difﬁcult to focus on one without
reﬂecting on the others. All require that one develops an
understanding of context: what might or might not happen,
how much different outcomes matter, what we know and do not
know, and so on.
The process of building a picture of the real world though
modelling is discussed in several places. There are, for instance,
the seminal texts of Ackoff (1962), Churchman (1971), Pidd
(1996), Tukey (1977) and White (1975, 1985). The Journal of
the Operational Research Society has had a tradition of
publishing articles on operational research (OR) methodology
and philosophy, which include many on the process of problem
formulation and modelling. Moreover, the literature on soft
systems and soft OR focuses on the sense-making processes
(see, eg, Checkland, 2001; Rosenhead andMingers, 2001; Shaw
et al, 2006, 2007). Knowledge management has a long literature
on sense-making too (see, eg, Weick, 1995; Kurtz and Snowden,
2003). Notwithstanding these remarks, many discussions of
statistical, risk and decision analyses begin with a putative
model: maybe quite a generic model, but a model, nonetheless.
A collection of well-deﬁned entities, stimuli, relationships and
behaviours observed ‘out there’ in the real world are taken as the
starting point. Entities are quickly labelled by variables; stimuli,
relationships and behaviours represented by functions. Uncer-
tainties may be recognised and probability models introduced to
represent some of these: stochastic behaviour, observational
errors, modelling errors and so on.
Note that I am somewhat catholic in what I mean by a
‘model’. In most cases, I mean a mathematical relationship; but
sometimes the model might be implicit in a computer code,
perhaps a simulation of actors and their interactions. Whatever
the case, in modelling we focus on a simpliﬁed part of reality,
which Savage (1972) dubbed a small world and which can be
represented intuitively by the model. My objective is to discuss
processes of focusing onto or constructing the small world that
will form the backdrop for an analysis. I want to ask how small
that world can be while still supporting the purpose of the
analysis. I also want to reﬂect on whether we should analyse in
the context of one small world or whether several small worlds
might better serve our needs.
Modelling and analysis
Discussing the relationship between our understanding of the
real world and of modelling and analysis, and of how conduct-
ing the latter informs our learning, risk management and
decision making inevitably takes us nearer to philosophy than
mathematics. Philosophers since the earliest times have debated
the so-called mind–body problem, which concerns how our
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mental lives, thinking and knowledge relate to the external
physical world. Some extreme subjectivists develop their
conception of thinking and knowledge without postulating the
existence of any real world, arguing that all we can do is seek to
represent relationships between our perceptions and stimuli.
Although a subjectivist, I am not that extreme and I shall be
concerned with our understanding of the external world and
how modelling and analysis can guide our actions within it. But
I recognise that philosophers have debated the mind-body
problem, knowledge and uncertainty for millennia without
reaching consensus. Thus much of the following is, at best, a
pragmatic view; at worst, personal prejudice.
Figure 1 is typical of many appearing in texts that discuss the
relationship between modelling, and analysis and induction.
The left-hand side indicates the modelling process in which we
ﬁrst focus on a small part of the real world that we perceive to
be of concern, that is, an abstraction from the complexity and
detail of the real world that has in its essence all that is relevant
to the issues that are being modelled. Of course, in being able to
separate out a small world from reality and discuss it, along
with behaviours within it, we are effectively forming a model, at
least in terms of a broad description. But the models that will
concern us are more conceptual and mathematical, and, while
mirroring those small world behaviours, are amenable to
analysis. These behaviours may be those that we perceive ‘out
there’ in the small world. In such cases we build a purely
descriptive model. In statistical, risk and decision modelling,
however, we sometimes include ourselves in the model and
assume that our behaviours are idealised in some sense: that is,
we assume that we use System 2 thinking based on conceptions
of rational, analytic behaviour, so building a prescriptivemodel
to guide our inferences, choices and subsequent behaviours.
French et al (2009) discuss prescriptive modelling in detail (for
related discussions, see Phillips, 1984; Bell et al, 1988;
Edwards et al, 2007). Note also that in more sophisticated
studies we seldom use a single model, but a family of models
representing different perspectives. Multiple explorations
within these models enable us to gain an intuition for how the
inputs and outputs are related; and we then broaden this
intuition to help us understand the real world—or at least those
aspects of the real world that lie within the the small world.
The right-hand side of Figure 1 represents the step back to the
real world on in which understandings of behaviours in the
models to induce a greater intuitive understanding of the real
world. We mean not just that we infer the values of some
parameters or derive a hard prescription of what to do, but that
we build a wider understanding of the objects and behaviours in
the world, how they interact and, in cases where a decision is to
be made, we understand better what to do.
This induction step inevitably brings with it uncertainties that
arise because the model is not a perfect representation of the
small world and that in focusing on the small world some other
relevant part of reality may have been ignored. OR, risk and
decision studies usually include implementation phases and so
face the harsh auditing that the future will bring. Thus, it is
usually recognised that actual behaviours may depart from
those anticipated in the modelling: that is, this induction step is
one that will be accompanied by uncertainty. Professional
statisticians too recognise the existence of modelling error, that
is, the discrepancies between model and real world behaviours.
Too many studies within the applied science and social
sciences, however, are published by authors and editors who
believe that, say, a 95% conﬁdence interval—even a Bayesian
one—relates to a precise 0.95 probability that covers all the
potential for error. They do not recognise that the inductive step
necessarily introduces further uncertainty. Policy and decision
makers, also, can have a tendency to ‘believe in the model’ too
much and be disappointed by what actually happens (see
French and Niculae, 2005 for a discussion of this in the context
of crisis management).
For the purposes of our discussion, we will consider three
major phases in conducting analyses (cf Holtzman, 1989;
French et al, 2009).
Sense-making: The process begins with sense-making and
modelling in which the context and issues of concern are
identiﬁed and formulated as models. This phase relates to the
dotted downward arrow on the left of Figure 1.
Analysis: In this phase the models are explored and analysed to
build an understanding of the behaviours exhibited by the
models. This phase relates to the calculations, explorations and
studies that take place in the conceptual world at the bottom of
Figure 1.
Induction: Through a process of induction the understandings
of behaviours within the model are developed into under-
standings of behaviours in the real world, thus interpreting the
results of the analysis and allowing the conclusions to be
implemented. This phase relates to the dotted upward arrow in
Figure 1.
The overall process is seldom as unidirectional as presented
here, but may iterate with the model being elaborated as
understanding grows.
Many different types of uncertainty need to be addressed in
this process. Table 1 provides a categorisation of these. Note
that relating each uncertainty type to the phase of the analytic



















Figure 1 Modelling, analysis and induction.
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deal with each category; it is not sufﬁcient just to label them.
For a discussion of the majority of these uncertainty types, see
French (1995); here we shall discuss the deep uncertainties
implicit in some of those in the ﬁrst and third phases.
Given that statistical, risk and decision analyses are about the
development, validation and use of knowledge, there is surpris-
ing little cross fertilisation with concepts and perspectives from
the literature of knowledge management. Knowledge and
uncertainty are polar opposites: the more knowledge we have,
the less uncertainty, and vice versa. In French et al (2009) and
French (2013) we explore some overlaps between these
literatures. Snowden’s Cyneﬁn framework is particularly infor-
mative. He introduced Cyneﬁn to categorise contexts for
inference and learning, knowledge management and decision
making. Cyneﬁn, while saying little that is new, provides an
intuitive backdrop for discussing many analytical processes.
I shall use it here to articulate our discussion of small worlds
and scenarios. The next section offers a brief introduction to
Cyneﬁn and its concepts.
Cyneﬁn: a context for our discussion
Cyneﬁn, see Figure 2, identiﬁes four different, but not entirely
distinct contexts for inference and decision. These should not be
thought of as providing a hard categorisation; the boundaries
are soft and contexts lying near these have characteristics drawn
from both sides. But taken with a suitably large ‘pinch of salt’,
Cyneﬁn will serve our discussion well.
The four categories identiﬁed by Cyneﬁn are: the Chaotic,
Complex, Knowable and Known Spaces. When contexts lie in
the Chaotic Space, we are unfamiliar with more or less every-
thing. We receive stimuli, but can see no pattern or relation-
ship between them. We cannot yet discern entities, events,
behaviours and so on. So we observe, we act tentatively,
‘prodding’ where we can to see what happens. Eventually we
begin to make sense of things: we see entities and behaviours,
we recognise events. As yet we cannot discern any cause and
effect relationships. Gradually, though, we do identify putative
causes and putative effects. We cannot say that they hold with
any certainty, but we recognise potential causes for some
effects. Now the context is said to lie in the Complex Space,
also known as the Realm of Social Systems, because typically
cause and effect are very difﬁcult to relate with any conﬁdence
in such systems. For instance, as I write this, we may be able to
identify a number of potential causes that would lead to Greece
leaving the Eurozone, but we understand none of them with
sufﬁcient certainty to make a conﬁdent prediction of whether
Greece will be in the Eurozone at the end of 2016. Perhaps a
few years later, we will be able to look back and explain
what happened and why, but we will need the 20–20 vision of
hindsight for that.
Over time, though, as we observe more, for some behaviours
we see more clearly how the causes and effects are related. We
can begin to set up controlled trials to conﬁrm our suspicions.
Eventually we are conﬁdent in our understanding of cause and
effects: we develop scientiﬁc laws to encapsulate this under-
standing. Such behaviours are recategorised as lying in the
Knowable Space. This space describes contexts in which we
have sufﬁcient understanding to build models, though not
enough to deﬁne all the parameters within those models. For
any application of the model we need to collect data and analyse
these to estimate the parameters. But again over time, we may
gain sufﬁcient experience that we know the parameters well
enough for all applications that further data gathering is
unnecessary. In this case, the context is recategorised to the
Known Space, recognising that we fully understand and can
predict cause and effect.
In this description of learning, knowledge increases in an
orderly, chronological fashion from the Chaotic Space through
the Complex and Knowable Spaces to arrive at the Known
Space. That is, of course, idealised. At any time, as we look at
the world some entities and behaviours lie in each space,
Table 1 Different forms of uncertainty arising in an analysis
Sense-
making
● Uncertainty about meaning/ambiguity
● Uncertainty about what might happen (the science)
● Uncertainty about how much impacts matter (values)
● Uncertainty about related decisions
Analysis ● Uncertainty because of physical randomness
● Uncertainty because of lack of knowledge
● Uncertainty about the evolution of future beliefs
and values
● Uncertainty about the accuracy of calculations
Induction ● Uncertainty about the appropriateness of descriptive
model (how well we have explained the world)
● Uncertainty about the appropriateness of normative
model (principles of modelling beliefs and values)
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Figure 2 The Cyneﬁn model (Snowden, 2002).
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recognising that we have learnt nothing about a few, something
about some and a lot about others. Moreover, it would be good
if progress were always clockwise as shown, but inevitably we
get things wrong on occasion and perceive cause and effect
where there are none, later learning our mistake and moving
back through Cyneﬁn anti-clockwise. In extreme cases,
Kuhn (1970) might term such anti-clockwise reversions a
paradigm shift.
Almost all the analytic tools used in statistical, operational
and risk analysis require that we are working in the Known and
Knowable Spaces; this must be the case for they are based on
models that assume an understanding of cause and effect. The
exceptions to this are techniques such as exploratory data
analysis, multivariate statistics, data mining, soft systems and
soft OR methods that are designed to catalyse and support
processes of sense-making.
There are many caveats that we should make—more than we
admit here (see French, 2013 for further discussion).
● Even in the Known Space our uncertainty is not quite zero.
We must always admit the possibility that our world may
change and our understandings that have served us well in
the past no longer apply. Just because the Sun has risen every
day in our lives does not mean it will do so tomorrow.
Nonetheless, we proceed on the assumption that it will,
planning our lives around tomorrow’s dawn. Similarly, we
accept Newton’s Laws of Motion and other well-tried and
tested scientiﬁc laws without question and ignore the uncer-
tainty that they may cease to hold. Moreover, we accept and
live with the uncertainties noted in Table 1.
● We should note that repetition is central to our thinking about
the Known and Knowable Spaces. In these cause and effect
are understood. In other words, we have experienced the
circumstances often enough to understand how different
causes or different levels of a cause lead to different effects.
We often express this understanding through a scientiﬁc law
or model, which we validate by repeatedly testing them under
controlled circumstances until we are sure that they predict
effects from a given set of causes. Repetition is central to the
Scientiﬁc Method, which expects scientiﬁc experiments to be
repeatable. This focus on repetition led naturally to the
development of the frequency concept of probability and
frequentist statistics (French, 2013). It is also worth noting
that repetition is also important in thinking about our values. If
we have experienced a situation repeatedly, we know what the
possible outcomes are and how they impact on us. We do not
have to think through and judge how we will feel in
completely novel circumstances (French, 2013).
● One should be careful to avoid terminological confusions
with complexity science and the Complex Space. Complexity
science is concerned with computational issues relating to
highly complicated models. Such models and computational
issues belong more to Knowable and Known Spaces rather
than the Complex.
Our concern in this paper is to discuss how we move from the
Complex Space to the Knowable Space and how the uncertain-
ties that we encounter are managed and modelled. Our percep-
tions of behaviours in the Complex Space recognises entities,
events and some putative relationships, but only vaguely, not in
sufﬁcient detail to model in anything but a rudimentary manner.
We face many uncertainties, some nebulous, too deep to be
modelled in a formal sense. As our knowledge and under-
standing increase, as we approach the boundary between the
Complex and the Knowable, we may have a putative model that
does capture our broad understanding of cause and effect, but
some uncertainties may remain so deep that we cannot usefully
encode them as probabilities. Even when conceptually we agree
on the structure of probabilities within the model, we may
disagree on some of their values, allowing ranges that are
effectively 0–1. They remain deep uncertainties. Over time,
further observations, experiences and insights bring us much
clearer perceptions, ones that we can model in detail and move
into the Knowable Space. Uncertainties may indeed will
remain, but they can be modelled and analysed in structured,
formalised ways, either through probabilities whose values are
agreed to lie within a sufﬁciently small range that they can be
analysed through sensitivity and robustness studies.
As I have indicated, once the deep uncertainties have been
resolved and we are safely in the Knowable Space, I believe that
the Bayesian subjective expected utility model provides the
appropriate methodology to articulate, analyse and address
uncertainty. The concern of this paper is to discuss in a little
more depth how that model might arise as knowledge accumu-
lates sufﬁciently to move from the Complex to the Knowable
Space, and how recent developments in scenario-focused
thinking combined with the Bayesian model might provide a
methodology to support this process. To do that we need look a
little more closely at Savage’s thinking on the Bayesian model.
Small worlds and the framing of statistical inference and
decision analysis
There are many axiomatic developments of Bayesian sub-
jective expected utility (see French and Rios Insua, 2000 for
a survey). We begin by focusing on Savage’s development
because his approach introduced the concept of a small world
and, moreover, he discussed in some depth how this abstrac-
tion related to reality, and thus how the modelling and
analysis could inform inference and decision. Savage’s
concept of a small world is effectively a single model
encoding ideas of cause and effect.
Savage (1972) discussed his concept of a small world in his
1954 monograph. He imagined a decision maker facing a
choice that is described by the small world. In a sense, his
conception differs from that shown in Figure 1, in that his small
world is effectively a mathematical model, whereas in the ﬁgure
a small world is shown as something more nebulous, a
perspective on a part of reality before a model is constructed.
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However, the difference is more one of terminology than a real
difference of meaning. As Wittgenstein (1921) argued, the use
of propositional logic within language acts as model for the part
of reality being described or discussed; and the step from
propositional logic to a mathematical model is but a small one.
Savage’s fundamental model relates to a triple {Θ,C,ℱ}:
Θ ¼ θ θj is a state of the worldf g
C ¼ c cj is a consequencef g
F ¼ f :Θ! C fj is an act which theDMcan choosef g
I make no apology for introducing mathematical notation
here, though we shall use it little, because its introduction
makes quite clear that we are now in the land of mathematical
models.
A state of the world is a possible description of the current
situation with all uncertainties resolved. Thus Θ is a set of
possible descriptions that spans all possibilities. However
great our uncertainty, the decision maker is sure that one of
the descriptions in Θ is true. The set of consequences C
contains all possible outcomes that may arise from the
decision-maker’s acts and the set ℱ contains all possible
acts, that is, each act relates outcomes to each possible state
of the world. Savage modelled acts as functions from Θ to C
and he included in ℱ all conceivable functions. For Savage,
the triple {Θ, C,ℱ} was the small world in which all further
analysis was focused. It should be a microcosm in which
analysis is possible and relevant to our concerns and under-
standing of the real world. Note that the small world {Θ, C,-
ℱ} encodes the decision-maker’s perception of cause and
effect. This means that the development of the small world
must take place in the context of the Knowable or Known
Spaces, almost invariably the former.
Savage further suggested seven postulates, which encode
the rationality that the decision maker might demand of her
preferences. He showed that these postulates led inexorably
to the Bayesian model: the decision maker within the small
world should choose as if she had a subjective probability
distribution representing her beliefs, a utility function repre-
senting her preferences between consequences and then rank
the acts according to expected utilities. Since Savage’s
development, there have been many alternative derivations
of the Bayesian model from a set of postulates or axioms,
some more constructive, separating the axiomatisation of the
decision-maker’s beliefs over Θ from the axiomatisation of
her preferences over C. Most effectively take {Θ, C,ℱ} as
the small world in which analyses are conducted. Some,
however, recognise explicitly that the small world needs a
model of the decision maker as well as a model of her
external world and include the decision-maker’s preference
relation, ≻, between acts within the deﬁnition taking {Θ, C,-
ℱ, ≻} as the small world. I concur with this view, as I take
the use of a normative model such as Savage’s within a
prescriptive analysis as providing a model of how a perfectly
rational decision maker with beliefs and preferences similar
to mine would decide in a simpliﬁed decision problem,
which parallels the one that I face (French, 1986; French
et al, 2009). Shafer in his 1986 retrospective on Savage’s
book takes a similar view describing a prescriptive analysis
based on a normative model as providing an ‘argument by
analogy’ (see also Goldstein, 2011).
Essentially, a small world plus the postulates deﬁne a model.
So we often refer to a small world as model, smearing the
distinction implied in Figure 1. Thus we shall write:
M¼ Θ;C;F;f g:
How big should a small world or model be? Howmuch detail
should be included? These were questions that Savage worried
at but did not resolve. He recognised that if the small world was
too small, then any analysis would be too limited to inform the
decision maker. But he also recognised that the grand world,
which included all future conceivable events and possible acts
in the decision-maker’s future was much too big to analyse,
writing:
The point of view under discussion may be symbolised by the
proverb ‘Look before you leap’ and the one to which it is opposed
by the proverb ‘You can cross that bridge when you come to it.’
When two proverbs conﬂict in this way, it is proverbially true that
there is some truth in both of them, but rarely, if ever, can their
common truth be captured by a single pat proverb. One must
indeed look before he leaps, in so far as the looking is not
unreasonably time-consuming and otherwise expensive; but there
are innumerable bridges one cannot afford to cross unless he
happens to come to them.
Carried to its logical extreme, the ‘Look before you leap’
principle demands that one envisage every conceivable policy
for the government of his whole life (at least from now on) in its
most minute details, in the light of the vast number of unknown
states of the world, and decide here and now on one policy. This
is utterly ridiculous, not—as some might think—because there
might latter be cause for regret, if things did not turn out as had
been anticipated, but because the task implied in making such a
decision is not even remotely resembled by human possibility. It
is even utterly beyond our power to plan a picnic or to play a
game of chess in accordance with the principle, even when the
world of states and the set of available acts to be envisaged are
artiﬁcially reduced to the narrowest reasonable limits.
Though the ‘Look before you leap’ principle is preposterous if
carried to the extremes, I would none the less argue that is the
proper subject of our further discussion, because to cross one’s
bridges when one comes to them means to attack relatively
simple problems of decision by artiﬁcially conﬁning attention to
so small a world that the ‘Look before you leap’ principle can be
applied there. I am unable to formulate criteria for selecting these
small worlds and indeed believe that their selection may be a
matter of judgement and experience about which it is impossible
to enunciate complete and sharply deﬁned general principles
though something more will be said in this connection in §5.5. On
the other hand, it is an operation in which we all necessarily have
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much experience, and one in which there is in practice consider-
able agreement. (Savage, 1972, pp 16–17)
Shortly after he says, ‘… I ﬁnd it difﬁcult to say with any
completeness how such isolated situations are actually arrived
at and justiﬁed’. He then rehearses an argument very similar in
ﬂavour to one picked up and extended by Phillips (1984) in
developing the theory of requisite decision modelling. Using
too small a small world can lead to difﬁculties in analysis.
Bordley and Hazen (1992) show that too small a world can miss
correlations and in the presence of dependent multi-attributed
preferences lead to apparent ‘irrationalities’. French et al (1997)
show a similar effect can arise if preferences depend on the
resolution of some key event. One can also argue that Allais’
and similar paradoxes arise because the choices are stated too
simplistically (French and Xie, 1994).
Savage, unaware naturally of these later writings, approached
the issue of how small a small world should be by considering the
consistency needed in a sequence of small worlds, each more
complex than and containing the previous one. The events in one
small world were a set of events in a larger small world
containing it; and the largest small world was his grand world.
Table 2 gives a simple example with three nested models. The
largest model, M1, is Savage’s grand world and represents the
decision-maker’s best understanding of the part of the Universe
on which he is focusing.M3 is an approximation to this in which
the calculations are at least conceptually possible. In the case of
highly complex models, it may be possible to evaluate M3 at
given points, but only at great cost and with long calculation
times. SoM3 is an emulation ofM2, which is muchmore tractable
and allows cost-effective evaluation (O’Hagan, 2006; Rougier
et al, 2009; Goldstein, 2011). While Savage did not interpret his
sequence of small worlds in this light, his arguments relating to
the consistency needed between the models and the analyses that
might be conducted on them provide the justiﬁcation for current
approaches to Bayesian statistics and decision analysis.
While the discussion has focused on Savage’s conception of
small worlds, the same thinking applies to other axiomatic
approaches to the Bayesian paradigm. All assume that the
models are related to reality—the same reality—and that that
reality provides the data from which we learn through analyses
within the models. Moreover, all make a further common
assumption: namely that there is a common reference or
auxiliary experiment running through the nested small worlds.
The reference experiment in axiomatic terms is simply a sub-σ-
ﬁeld on which the decision maker or scientist perceives an
uniform distribution. To give this a practical interpretation, to
use Bayesian analysis it is necessary to elicit subjective
probabilities and utilities. This is done conceptually by showing
the decision maker some randomising device such as a
probability wheel. The decision maker is assumed to judge the
wheel to be fair and unbiased and thus to judge events of equal
size on the wheel to be equally likely. By comparing (i) events
on the wheel with events in a small world and (ii) simple
gambles constructed on the wheel with possible outcomes in the
small world, it is possible to elicit and model the decision-
maker’s judgements as probabilities and utilities (French et al,
2009). In Savage’s development this is done in his P7 postulate.
In the next section we shall see that an obvious extension of
the Bayesian paradigm to ﬁt with recent approaches to scenario-
focused thinking means that we must revisit and modify these
assumptions.
Scenarios and quantitative risk, and decision analyses
Several authors have begun discussions on how more qualita-
tive forms of analytic discussion may be combined with more
quantitative forms and, in particular, the idea of using multiple
scenarios to conduct several parallel quantitative analyses. The
combination of scenario planning and multi-criteria decision
analysis has been a frequent focus (Wright and Goodwin, 1999;
Montibeller et al, 2006; Ram et al, 2011; Schroeder and
Lambert, 2011; Stewart et al, 2013). Williamson and
Goldstein (2012) show how statistical emulation techniques
can make the analysis of large complex decision trees tractable
and also indicate how their methods can be integrated with
scenario planning. Burt (2011) offers a perspective and illus-
trative case study on the integration of scenario planning and
systems modelling. French et al (2010) built decision trees in a
range of scenarios to explore issues in the sustainability of
nuclear power in the United Kingdom.
French (2013) argues that such scenario-focused thinking can
be viewed as a stage in moving from the Complex Space to the
Knowable Space. The idea is that in making sense of some issues
there can be either uncertainties that are so deep or such gross
differences in values that a simple Bayesian analysis cannot be
used to articulate discussion in any useful way. Experts may
disagree on some uncertainties or stakeholders disagree on some
societal values so much that sensitivity analysis on any expected
utility model will show that some quite disparate alternatives
Table 2 The use of nested models within the analysis phase
The ‘real world’—whatever that might be, but it is what the decision
maker is trying to understand and model
Sense-making: The best current scientiﬁc knowledge and
understanding of the underlying science together with some broad

















↓ M1, the most complete mathematical model of the system
that the scientists can build, perhaps implicit and completely
intractable
M2, an approximation toM1 to make calculations
conceptually, if not practically possible
M3, an emulator of M2 making the calculations yet more
tractable
Induction: Interpretation of the results of analysis and understanding
the import of the calculations using M3
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might all be optimal. The analysis would exhibit the key
disagreements, but do little to inform debate and support any
move to consensus. Scenario-focused thinking accepts this and
begins by focusing on several scenarios. In each, deep uncertain-
ties and key values are ﬁxed to capture an ‘interesting perspec-
tive’ on the issues. The remaining uncertainties and values
involved are sufﬁciently understood that informative decision
analysis becomes possible within each scenario. Participants to
the decision will see that, subject to assuming particular
resolution of the deep uncertainties and accepting particular
societal values built into a scenario, there is a reasonable clarity
on the way forward. Sometimes, one or more strategies may be
dominant in all or most of the expected utility analyses across the
scenarios; or there may be a set of strategies that perform poorly
in all scenarios. Generally, however, little attempt is made to
bring the analyses together across scenarios; that is, left to
qualitative debate between stakeholders, experts and the ulti-
mate decision makers.
What constitutes an interesting perspective is moot. How-
ever, some examples may be given. For instance, in considering
the economic viability of an energy portfolio with high levels of
nuclear and renewable generation, a deep uncertainty relates to
whether some form of energy storage can be developed that
allows the slowly variable output of nuclear plants and the
vagaries of most renewables to be matched smoothly to
relatively fast-changing energy demand. Such storage might
come, for instance, from some form of geological heat sink,
some novel form of chemical battery capable of taking huge
charge or the development of a substantial hydrogen economy.
But the development of any of these and the dates by which
they might come on stream if developed are deeply uncertain
with much disagreement between the relevant experts. One can
examine, however, ‘interesting’ scenarios in which each comes
to fruition and do so at different dates. Equally the viability of
any energy portfolio is also determined by the economic and
political climate and such things as whether a low-carbon
economy or rapid growth in economic output is pursued by the
government. Again interesting scenarios may be established in
each of which one of such possibilities is assumed.
There are many parallels between scenarios as they are used
in scenario-focused decision analysis and small worlds. Both
embody simpliﬁed perspectives on possible futures. Both set
the bounds of subsequent quantitative analysis delineating what
will be modelled and what will be left to intuition and
judgement outside the analysis. Reading Savage’s reﬂections
on how a small world may be developed to capture the
decision-maker’s understanding of the issues that matter shows
many parallels with discussions of the developments of scenar-
ios (Schoemaker, 1993; van der Heijden, 1996; Mahmoud et al,
2009). We have already noted the similarity of some of
Savage’s thinking with that of requisite modelling (Phillips,
1984), and scenario need to be developed in a requisite fashion.
However, there are differences. As we have seen, Savage
developed small worlds as a description of reality. Although
there are uncertainties within any of Savage’s small worlds,
there is an assumption that their span contains a perspective on
what will ultimately come to pass. There is no such assumption
in the development of a set of scenarios: no claim that they span
reality in any sense. They are just an interesting set of scenarios,
each of which captures some concept of the future that the
decision makers wish to discuss. Such a distinction has
implications because implicit in Savage’s conception is the idea
that as data accumulate, the judgements within prior distribu-
tions of belief will be dominated and posterior distributions
will become more and more tightly located around the ‘truth’.
The Bayesian view of scientiﬁc consensus (Box and Taio,
1973; French, 2013) is predicated on the small worlds used in
analysis containing reality.
Moreover, there is a signiﬁcant technical difference.
Because Savage essentially considered only one or a nested
series of small worlds, his axiomatisation could bury the
reference experiment within the axiomatisation of beliefs and
preferences within the small world: his P7 implicitly postu-
lates the existence of the reference experiment. Once one
begins to consider analyses within non-nested small worlds,
that is, scenarios, his approach would lead to several
reference experiments, one in each. Moreover, there is
nothing in his axiomatisation that would make the quantita-
tive results obtained from analyses within each scenario
comparable and consistent across scenarios. Maybe this is a
case of mathematical pedantry; but unless this issue is
addressed, many comparisons of the quantitative analyses
across scenarios would be quantitatively meaningless
(Krantz et al, 1971; Roberts, 1979; French, 1986).
Obviously one route out of this conundrum is to create an
eighth axiom P8, which makes all the reference experiments
essentially the same. A better route is to separate the
axiomatisation of the reference experiment from that of
beliefs and preferences within each small world (cf French,
1982; Xie and French, 1997; French and Rios Insua, 2000),
thus creating a common reference scale against which to
elicit the decision-makers’ judgements. This makes the
numerical calculations within each scenario comparable
across them, without any implication that the scenarios
themselves are equally likely or equally important. Indeed,
doing so has no implications for any quantitative weighting,
equal or unequal of the scenarios.1 The axiomatic details and
further discussion may be found in French (2014).
Separating the axiomatisation of the reference experiment
from that of beliefs and preferences in each scenario is
particularly useful because it clariﬁes how the reference
experiment forms the basis of elicitation and can help clarify
the framing of the judgements that are asked of the decision
makers. But doing so makes clear that we may be asking
much more difﬁcult judgements from the decision makers
than Savage envisaged. We noted that his original approach
1Note that scenario-focused Bayesian analysis is quite distinct from
Bayesian model choice methodologies, which require that we are working in
the Knowable Space, identifying a best ﬁt to reality.
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assumed a nested sequence of models reaching up to a single
reality, one that the decision makers accept. In scenario-
focused thinking, we may explore scenarios which all
participants believe are effectively impossible, but which
are interesting because of the perspective that they offer. For
instance, in an environmental debate we might consider an
interesting and potentially informative scenario in which all
nations agree on a drastic carbon reduction regime and in
which all businesses, industries and individuals genuinely
seek to achieve this. While this is conceptually possible,
I doubt that any party to the debate would consider it to
have any chance of becoming reality. Thus in elicitation, we
must ask the decision makers to consider the judgements that
they would hold in this imaginary world. It may be much
harder for the decision makers to make consistent judge-
ments in such an imaginary world, and it will be harder for
analysts to constructively challenge these judgements with-
out recourse to reality in testing their consistency. The
current literature on scenario-focused thinking does contain
suggestions indicating that decision makers ﬁnd the approach
harder and less easy to interpret than the more conventional
Bayesian approach: for example, the Italian case in
Montibeller et al (2006). Moreover, there is little clear
agreement yet on how one might display and explore
different scenarios with decision makers. That it is hard to
deal with deep uncertainties is not surprising, but it should be
recognised.
Conclusion
Picking up the various threads of this argument:
● The foundations of Bayesian analysis assume that all aleatory
and epistemological uncertainty can be modelled as
probabilities.
● In practice, this approach is softened by the use of discussion
to resolve ambiguity and sensitivity analysis to address
moderate disagreements over the values of particular prob-
abilities and utilities.
● Such approaches have been developed and well-studied for
the Known and Knowable Spaces, but do not address the
deep uncertainties and deep disagreements that occur in the
Complex Space.
● Such deep uncertainties may be explored through the use of a
set of scenarios each of which makes assumptions to ﬁx the
deep uncertainties at ‘interesting’ values.
● However, the justiﬁcation of this form of scenario-focused
analysis requires that we revisit the axiomatisations of the
Bayesian model to allow for several parallel rather than
nested small worlds.
● Axiomatising the Bayesian model in parallel small worlds
weakens the connection between the model(s) and the
real world.
As we noted at the end of the last section, this weakening of the
connection between the models and reality means that it may be
more difﬁcult cognitively to build understanding and interpret
scenario-focused analyses. If we are to use scenario-focused
analyses effectively, we need to understand better the justiﬁca-
tion of the Bayesian model in the context of parallel small
worlds and how this may help explore deep uncertainties.
Barankin (1956) wrote ‘… all reality is one grand stochastic
process, and any system is a marginal process of this universal
process’. In doing so, he caught the mood in mathematical
modelling that existed at the time and had inﬂuenced Savage in
his development Bayesian decision theory. One could conceive
of an all-embracing model: a grand world. The recent moves
towards scenario-focused thinking may be seen as a step back
from that, one that suggests that, in dealing with complex
issues, it may be wise to consider several disjoint stochastic
processes—several small worlds—each of which captures a
different perspective. Fixing deep uncertainties or strong dis-
agreements about societal values in interesting scenarios might
help us inform debate and make sense of very complex issues.
However, to date developments of scenario-focused analyses
have been largely pragmatic. Our discussion has suggested that
formal justiﬁcations of Bayesian analyses need to be modiﬁed
to ﬁt with the use of parallel small worlds. Careful study of the
required modiﬁcations may provide a better understanding of
the judgements required from the decision makers, thus eluci-
dating the elicitation process and helping interpret the output of
the analyses. That will require much further work.
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